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THE GAP BETWEEN MARTINEZ AND DAVILA: 
SERVING THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS CASES 
LEXIE WARD 
INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 2017, the United States Supreme Court 
announced a decision in Davis v. Davila, which bars substantial claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that have been procedurally 
defaulted.1 However, despite the merits of limiting the number of cases which 
were not diligently pursued by an inmate, the Court states its conclusion too 
broadly and now effectively bars a prisoner from bringing claims of 
significant trial error in front of any court. A prisoner’s claim that was not 
available until a trial-level appeal, and was then avoided due to ineffective 
post-conviction counsel, may now be dodged by a court on federal habeas 
corpus, and a significant constitutional trial right may never be heard by a 
United States Court. 
Before a discussion of the gap present between two significant 
landmark habeas corpus cases, Davila and Martinez v. Ryan, a few things are 
important to note. It is important to understand the history of the federal 
habeas corpus system, its constitutional foundations, its procedural 
mechanisms, and how state courts come into the mix while still ensuring a 
system of federalism is respected. A brief history of the federal habeas system 
outlines its pre-constitutional roots derived from the English court system 
and emphasizes the importance placed on the writ of habeas corpus by our 
founding fathers, which led to the inclusion of the writ in the Constitution. 
As part of the creation of a federal system of government, the importance of 
states’ right to fully hear and exhaust state claims before a federal court may 
review it emerged, promoting notions of supremacy and state sovereignty. 
Further, the concept of a procedural default demonstrates that there 
are some state claims that can never be brought in a federal court, based 
solely on a prisoner’s failure to present a claim to a state court, serving the 
notion of federalism. However, evolution of the writ of habeas corpus led the 
Court to allow a petitioner to bring certain procedurally exhausted claims 
                                                 
 1. Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017). 
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after satisfying both that they have a cause for the procedural default, and 
that actual prejudice has befallen them because of such omission. 
Next, a trilogy of cases, culminating with the latest decision of 
Davila, gives a thorough background of the federalism concerns addressed 
in the realm of federal habeas corpus. These cases also establish when a 
federal court may hear certain claims from a state prisoner, and when those 
claims are procedurally barred from a federal appeal. Coleman v. Thompson 
discusses the idea of allocating the costs of burdens between the state and the 
prisoner depending on when counsel is constitutionally guaranteed.2 Then, 
Martinez recognizes a finely narrow exception to the decision in Coleman, 
that allows in the narrowest of circumstances, for a federal court to hear a 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, when post-conviction counsel 
was ineffective in failing to raise such a claim.3 And finally, the Davila 
Court’s decision to reject an extension of the Martinez exception discusses 
the difference in ineffective assistance claims of trial and appellate counsel,4 
and inadvertently creates a gap that will result in significant trial errors 
evading review from any court. 
Finally, a look into the Davila decision, along with illustrative 
examples found in Justice Breyer’s dissent, reveals a glaring gap between the 
majority opinions in Martinez and Davila that ultimately calls for an equally 
narrow exception, which extends the Martinez exception to claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on stand-alone 
constitutional errors. 
I. ORIGINS AND IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
While at common law there existed six different types of writs of 
habeas corpus, the modern “great writ” of habeas corpus, literally translated 
to “let us have the body,” simply requires a person be brought forth before a 
court.5 Once a prisoner is brought before a court by way of the writ, that court 
may look into the legality of that prisoner’s confinement to either grant or 
deny the requested relief of release.6 The use of the writ, however, to 
physically bring a prisoner to court to challenge his confinement is not 
necessary to grant a release based on a petition of habeas corpus, especially 
when the constitutionality of confinement has been blatantly violated.7 
The modern writ of habeas corpus is viewed as a shield to those 
improperly imprisoned, but the origins of the writ were not as protective.8 
The earliest use of the writ of habeas corpus was not to free individuals from 
                                                 
 2. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991). 
 3. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012). 
 4. Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2066–68. 
 5. 20 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (Originally published in 1973). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Book Note, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1186 (1982) (reviewing WILLIAM F. DUKER, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980)). 
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the judicial system, but rather to bring them within the court’s reach.9 
Originally, the writ was used to bring certain criminal offenders before the 
king’s court, and was widely used to haul various people into court, whether 
or not a serious crime was committed.10 During the fourteenth century, a shift 
occurred where the Court of Chancery began to not only use the writ as a 
court summons, but also to review the detention of prisoners, a reflection of 
the modern writ.11 
As time progressed, English political strife led to altered forms of the 
writ used primarily for jurisdictional battles.12 The Chancellor of Parliament 
and the King’s Bench, each claiming jurisdiction, would use the writ to 
attempt to circumvent unfavorable decisions by the other.13 The Chancellor 
would endeavor by way of injunction to block a prisoner from bringing a 
claim to the King’s Bench.14 In return, the Crown would attempt to 
implement the writ to free that very same prisoner.15 This original use of the 
writ was not determined by a prisoner’s guilt or innocence; this use of the 
writ was a power struggle over jurisdiction by the opposing forces of the 
Chancellor and Crown.16 Eventually, the struggle between the two ceased as 
Parliament successfully passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and the 
writ’s official use protected prisoners from arbitrary imprisonment by the 
Crown.17 
This clash of powers between Parliament and the Crown, both 
attempting to use the writ for two different purposes, reflects our modern 
clash between federal and state courts.18 Of course, with the United States’ 
original court system deeply rooted in the English system, recognition of the 
writ of habeas corpus has been present in the states since the original 
founding of the colonies.19 With the creation of the Constitution, and its 
deliberate separation of state and federal governments, the First Congress and 
the Framers were careful to draft the habeas clause in line with the notions of 
state sovereignty, limiting Congress’s power to suspend state habeas for 
federal prisoners.20 
Article 1, Section 9 of the United States Constitution guarantees that 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
required in the interest of public safety.21 There are three types of federal 
                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id at 1186-87. 
 12. Id. at 1187. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1187-88. 
 19. Id. at 1188. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261 
(3d. ed. 2017). 
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habeas corpus remedies, but the two most common are found in 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2254 and 2255.22 Under § 2254 a state prisoner can challenge his state 
court conviction or sentence in federal court based on constitutional 
grounds.23 Section 2255 is the equivalent of § 2254, but offers federal 
prisoners the chance to challenge their federal convictions or sentences. 24 
Reform of these modern statutes used by practitioners today began as early 
as the 18th century, and has involved great expansion, and then contraction, 
of judicial power in implementing the writ.25 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted courts federal jurisdiction to issue 
writs of habeas corpus, which originally only extended to federal prisoners.26 
In 1867, Congress extended the authorization of courts to “grant the writ ‘in 
all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation 
of the constitution [sic], or of any treaty or law of the United States.’”27 This 
act of Congress effectively made the writ of habeas corpus not only available 
to federal prisoners, but state prisoners as well.28 
This expansive availability to both federal and state prisoners 
brought on a series of phases in habeas corpus that drastically expanded 
courts’ power in exercising the writ. Originally, a federal court’s 
authorization to issue the writ of habeas corpus was limited to that in 
accordance with the common law; federal court examination was limited to 
determining the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.29 Further, the Supreme 
Court declined to encroach on state court judgments of conviction.30 In Ex 
parte Parks, the Court determined that where a sentencing court properly 
held jurisdiction over a case, the writ could not lie.31 However, this decision 
did not limit the established notions of supremacy; when a judgment was 
unconstitutional on its face, the writ would lie.32 
Gradually, the scope of review was expanded to assess what were 
previously thought of as “unreviewable decisions involving fundamental 
rights.”33 The Court began to hold that constitutional claims may be reviewed 
on habeas corpus, relying on the theory that unconstitutional deprivations 
necessarily stripped a trial court of jurisdiction.34 After the legislation 
                                                 
 22. Brent E. Newton, A Primer on Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Review, 
CHAMPION, June 2005, at 16, 17. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261. 
 26. Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 
557, 563–64 (1994). 
 27. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Margolis, supra note 26, at 564. 
 30. 39 AM. JUR. TRIALS Historical Aspects and Procedural Limitations of Federal 
Habeas Corpus § 4 (1989). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Margolis, supra note 26, at 564. 
 34. Id. 
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extending the writ to state prisoners passed in 1867, this broad interpretation 
of reviewing constitutional claims allowed for an expansive use of the writ 
for any incarcerated person, whether held federally or by a state, when the 
challenge was purely constitutional.35 
Several landmark decisions by the Supreme Court progressively 
produced the modern era of habeas corpus, when the Court expanded its use 
to bring a state prisoner’s claim before federal courts. In Frank v. Mangum, 
the Court indicated in dictum that if a state appellate court’s procedures were 
found inadequate to fully consider a prisoner’s rights, the Court could 
properly examine the merits of such a case.36 In Brown v. Allen, the Court 
held that even when a state’s highest court has fully adjudicated a case, a 
petitioner is entitled to full and fair consideration of his constitutional claims 
on federal habeas corpus, and a federal court may consider both law and fact 
on rehearing.37 By far, the most expansive and far-reaching expansion of 
federal habeas relief came from the Court’s holding in Fay v. Noia that a 
federal court may, and should, consider a constitutional claim on habeas 
review even if a petitioner failed to fully exhaust state appellate procedures, 
if at the time the issue was raised in a federal court state review options were 
no longer available.38 
In Fay v. Noia, a new test emerged to examine procedural defaults 
of prisoner’s claims. In Fay, even though the petitioner was not said to have 
committed a “deliberate bypass” of the state courts, the Court’s decision 
created such a test to determine whether a procedural default had in fact 
occurred to effectively bar a prisoner’s constitutional claim.39 The Court held 
that a procedural default (a failure to raise a claim below in a state court that 
would bar a federal court from subsequently hearing that same claim) would 
not apply unless it could be shown that a prisoner had “deliberately 
bypassed” a state court’s opportunity to hear the claim, by intentionally 
failing to raise a constitutional issue until he or she could gain access to a 
federal court through habeas corpus petition.40 Proving a deliberate bypass, 
rather than an accidental omission, had occurred was left to the court to 
decide, creating an unpredictable application of habeas corpus.41 
This drastic expansion of the writ of habeas corpus continued 
steadily until the 1976 decision in Stone v. Powell.42 In Stone, where two 
prisoners were convicted based on evidence obtained through an illegal 
search, the majority held that since the state court had fully and fairly litigated 
the Fourth Amendment claim, a federal court may not hear it.43 Despite 
                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 564-65. 
 37. Id. at 565. 
 38. Id. at 565-66. 
 39. Id. at 566. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 568. 
 42. Id. at 566. 
 43. Id. at 567. 
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agreement amongst the Court that these two prisoners’ Fourth Amendment 
rights had been severely violated, the Court determined that their 
constitutional right to challenge such claims was exhausted once a state court 
had fully litigated the issue.44 Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, 
pointed out that this method of eliminating review of constitutional claims 
by federal courts “effectively cast the district courts sitting in habeas in the 
role of surrogate Supreme Courts.”45 
Finally, along came the pivotal case Wainwright v. Sykes, putting a 
much-desired end to the “deliberate bypass” test from Fay, and reigning in 
the unfettered judicial power over petitions for federal habeas.46 Sykes 
ushered in a new test that is still used in modern habeas cases today to assess 
whether a procedural default has occurred, and whether a court may 
nonetheless hear that procedurally defaulted claim.47 In Sykes, the Court 
reduced the effects of Fay by limiting the basis on which a state prisoner can 
bring a constitutional claim in his or her habeas petition if a state court has 
already heard the issue.48 Sykes initially precludes habeas relief, unless a state 
prisoner can demonstrate both a “cause” for his failure to assert a claim, or 
to timely bring such claim in a lower state court, and “actual prejudice” 
resulting from the alleged constitutional deprivation.49 
Today, the most significant use of the statutes is issuance of the writ 
when a prisoner is held in violation of the federal Constitution or federal 
laws.50 A petitioner must satisfy the Sykes “cause and prejudice” standard to 
overcome any procedural defaults.51 The Supreme Court has noted in past 
cases that a failure to satisfy the “cause” prong is fatal to a petitioner’s case.52 
What may satisfy the “cause” prong of the Sykes standard to allow a 
petitioner to overcome a procedural default of a claim has evolved over the 
years and, most pertinently to this note, is detailed by a trilogy of cases 
discussed below: Coleman, Martinez, and Davila. However, before a 
discussion of these pivotal cases, it is important to grasp the doctrines of 
exhaustion and procedural exhaustion, and to appreciate the procedural 
differences between the two concepts. 
                                                 
 44. Id. at 568. 
 45. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 511–12 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 46. Id. at 568–69. 
 47. Id. at 569. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261. 
 51. Margolis, supra note 26, at 569. 
 52. Id. at 570. 
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II. JUDICIALLY-CREATED PROCEDURAL HURDLES: THE BASIC NOTIONS 
OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 
A.  Exhaustion 
The exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus mandates full 
and fair presentation of claims under § 2254 to all available levels of state 
courts for review before presenting the exact same claim to a federal court, 
which may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner 
unless, with certain exceptions, the prisoner has exhausted all available state 
remedies.53 “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged 
violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 
that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 
Constitution.”54 The “mere similarity of [state and federal] claims” is 
insufficient for fair presentation.55 A petitioner does not fairly present a 
federal claim “by present[ing] the state courts only with the facts necessary 
to state a claim of relief.”56 General appeals to broad constitutional principles 
are insufficient to establish fair presentation for exhaustion purposes.57 
These decisions are supported by well-established principles of 
comity between the state and federal governments.58 The Supreme Court has 
a strong aversion to original consideration of federal claims that were not 
made clearly apparent to the state courts, which are equally as capable of 
reviewing and resolving both federal and state-law issues.59 “The premise of 
our adversarial system is that appellate courts do no sit as self-directed boards 
of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions 
presented and argued by the parties before them.”60 Fair presentation protects 
our country’s adversarial system, promotes established principles of comity, 
and enhances administration of justice in the state appellate courts.61 
B. Procedural Default 
The procedural-default doctrine is ancillary to the exhaustion 
requirement.62 A “procedural default” is a distinct and separate sanction for 
failing to fully exhaust remedies, and is therefore given a separate 
                                                 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); 
Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 418–19 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 54. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995). 
 55. Id. at 366. 
 56. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). 
 57. Id. at 162. 
 58. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000). 
 59. Id. 
 60. United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Carducci v. Regan, 741 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 61. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 452. 
 62. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 452-53. 
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denomination as it has its own administrative procedures.63 If a state court 
was never fully and fairly presented a federal claim, and a state-court remedy 
is no longer available, commonly because of statutes of limitations on 
appeals, the claim is technically exhausted but procedurally barred.64 
Additionally, if a constitutional claim is presented to federal courts resting 
on one theory, but was presented to a state court resting on a separate theory, 
the claim is procedurally defaulted.65 Further, “reconsideration of [a] federal 
issue on federal habeas [is curtailed] as long as the state court explicitly 
invokes a state procedural bar rule as a . . . basis for decision.”66 As an 
illustration, in Harris v. Reed, a waiver supplied an adequate and independent 
state-law ground to bar federal habeas review, notwithstanding a petitioner 
demonstrating cause and prejudice.67 A claim that has been procedurally 
defaulted is barred from federal review, unless a petitioner can satisfy the 
Sykes “cause and prejudice” standard to excuse the default.68 
Just as the doctrine of exhaustion has roots respecting comity, the 
purpose of the procedural default doctrine serves the notions of finality and 
federalism.69 “[T]he federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 
based on adequate and independent state law procedural grounds.”70 Sykes 
allows for “cause” to lie and excuse a procedural default, even when a state 
procedural ground bars the claim in federal court. What constitutes “cause” 
under the Sykes standard has been the subject of a series of cases, including 
Coleman, Martinez, and Davila. 
III. A TRILOGY OF CASES MOLDING THE WAYS THAT A CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL MAY SERVE AS “CAUSE” FOR 
ANOTHER PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED CLAIM. 
A. Coleman v. Thompson 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, coined Coleman as a case 
concerning federalism, about “the respect that federal courts owe to the States 
and the States’ procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners 
in federal habeas corpus.”71 A Virginia County court convicted Roger Keith 
Coleman of rape and capital murder.72 The trial court sentenced Coleman to 
                                                 
 63. 20 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (Originally published in 1973). 
 64. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 752-53 (1991). 
 65. Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 321-22 (6th Cir. 1998) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim was procedurally defaulted when petitioner’s argument in state courts relied 
upon different grounds than argument on habeas appeal). 
 66. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 (1989). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 20 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (Originally published in 1973). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. citing Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004). 
 71. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727 (1991). 
 72. Id. 
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death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.73 In his state habeas claim, 
Coleman raised several constitutional claims, not raised before on direct 
appeal, all of which failed.74 Eventually, Coleman filed for appeal of his state 
habeas claim to the Virginia Supreme Court.75 The parties filed briefs 
addressing the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss for his untimely filing of 
appeal, as well as the merits of the claims; the Virginia Supreme Court 
ultimately dismissed Coleman’s appeal.76 
Coleman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, presenting four 
federal constitutional claims, all of which he previously raised on direct 
appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, as well as seven additional claims that 
were raised in the first instance in his state habeas claim.77 The District Court 
held that “by virtue of the dismissal of his appeal by the Virginia Supreme 
Court in state habeas, Coleman had procedurally defaulted the seven 
claims.”78 Nonetheless, the District Court addressed the merits of all eleven 
claims, and denied petition.79 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed.80 The Fourth Circuit held that Coleman’s seven 
claims that were presented for the first time in his state habeas proceeding 
were all procedurally defaulted because of the failure for timely filing of the 
appeal.81 However, Coleman argued that the Virginia Supreme Court did not 
specify whether their dismissal was based on a procedural default, and 
therefore it should not be treated as such without clear indication.82 The 
Fourth Circuit disagreed, and held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s 
decision was based “on independent and adequate state grounds and that 
Coleman had not shown cause to excuse the default.”83 Therefore, Coleman’s 
claims presented only in his state habeas proceeding were held procedurally 
barred.84 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
relationship between state procedural defaults and federal habeas review. The 
Court held that a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed 
if the prisoner has not exhausted all available state remedies as to any of his 
federal claims.85 The exhaustion requirement is grounded in principles of 
comity, where “the States should have the first opportunity to address and 
                                                 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 728. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 728-29. 
 84. Id. at 729. 
 85. Id. at 731. 
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correct alleged violations of state prisoner’s federal rights.”86 So when a 
prisoner or a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust all State procedural 
requirements for presenting his federal claims, he has denied the state court 
the first opportunity to address those claims and provide an independent and 
adequate state ground to support the judgment.87 Without applying the 
independent and adequate state ground doctrine in habeas proceedings, 
petitioners would attempt to avoid exhaustion by defaulting their federal 
claims in state court.88 Applying the independent and adequate state ground 
doctrine gives the states a shot at correcting mistakes in all federal habeas 
cases.89 
In his petition, Coleman stated that there was in fact cause for his 
default caused by the untimely filing of his state habeas appeal.90 Coleman 
claimed that the late filing was the result of attorney error on the part of his 
post-conviction counsel, and that this should have excused the procedural 
default in his federal habeas proceeding.91 Essentially, Coleman was putting 
before the Court, the idea that ineffective counsel’s failure to timely raise his 
claims should serve as “cause” within the Sykes standard to excuse the 
underlying procedural default of those seven claims brought initially in his 
state habeas appeal. 
Until this case, the Court provided only the narrowest of exceptions 
to excuse a default based on attorney error.92 “So long as a defendant is 
represented by counsel, whose performance is not constitutionally 
ineffective, under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, we 
discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that 
results in a procedural default.”93 The Court further noted that there is no 
constitutional right to counsel in a state post-conviction proceeding; 
therefore, the error cannot be constitutionally ineffective, and cannot serve 
as “cause” needed to excuse a procedural default.94 The Coleman Court held 
that the existence of cause for a procedural default must turn on an objective 
external factor that prevented their counsel from complying with a State’s 
procedural rules, such as “interference by officials”, or “a showing that the 
factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.”95 
But the Court clearly stated “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is not 
‘cause’ because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing 
to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk 
                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 732. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 752. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487). 
 94. Id. at 752. 
 95. Id. at 753. 
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of attorney error.’”96 Thus, the Court effectively stated that Coleman’s 
habeas attorney’s error could only serve as cause to excuse the procedural 
default of his seven claims if that attorney’s error was due to external factors, 
rather than plain attorney error. 
The Court distinguished this by stating that if attorney error 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment would 
require that error to constitute cause for a default.97 “[I]t is not the gravity of 
the attorney’s error that matters, but that it constitutes a violation of 
petitioner’s right to counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external 
factor.”98 Therefore, in a direct appeal proceeding, where counsel is 
guaranteed by our Constitution, if a petitioner defaults a claim as the result 
of ineffective assistance of counsel or attorney error, it is the State that is 
responsible for bearing that cost of the resulting default, not the prisoner.99 
The Coleman Court found “a different allocation of costs” occurs in 
proceedings where the State has no responsibility to ensure that counsel is 
provided to a prisoner, such as post-conviction proceedings, and the prisoner 
must bear the cost in that instance.100 In such cases where no right to counsel 
is guaranteed, such as Coleman’s state habeas proceeding, the Court 
effectively held that ineffective counsel could not serve as “cause” to excuse 
a procedural default, absent a clear violation of a petitioner’s constitutional 
rights. 
However, the unique structure of Virginia’s appeals process gave the 
Court pause to consider another aspect of when a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel could be brought. Coleman’s claims that were brought 
in his state habeas proceeding included ineffective assistance of counsel 
during trial, sentencing, and appeal.101 Coleman asserted that these claims 
must constitute cause, because under Virginia law ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, related to counsel’s conduct during trial or appeal, could only 
be brought in a state habeas proceeding.102 He argued that his state habeas 
attorney’s error in failing to timely file his claims in his state habeas 
proceeding, the first forum in which his claims could be raised, justified 
cause.103 
In response, the Court reiterated, “Counsel’s ineffectiveness will 
constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional violation.”104 There 
is no right to counsel in a state post-conviction or collateral proceeding, and 
one state court has already addressed Coleman’s claims: the state habeas trial 
                                                 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 754. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 756. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 755. 
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court.105 Further, the Court answered the question of whether Coleman had a 
constitutional right to counsel on appeal from a state habeas trial court 
judgment in the negative.106 Because Coleman, just as any other criminal 
defendant, had no right to counsel beyond his first appeal, he could not be 
said to have a right to counsel in appealing a state collateral determination of 
his claims of trial error.107 Without a right to counsel in his state habeas 
proceeding, the Coleman Court proclaimed any attorney error resulting in a 
default of his claims cannot constitute cause to excuse a default in federal 
habeas.108 
Essentially, the Coleman Court determined his state habeas 
counsel’s error was not a violation of a constitutional right and, therefore, 
could not serve as cause to overcome the procedurally defaulted claims. 
Because the error by the attorney was not a violation of Coleman’s 
constitutional rights and was instead a late filing error, the ineffectiveness of 
counsel was not severe enough to serve as “cause” under the Sykes standard. 
Without “cause” to overcome the procedural default, Coleman’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial and appeal counsel could not be heard. 
B. Martinez v. Ryan 
The harsh result in Coleman was later visited again in Martinez v. 
Ryan when a new state procedural wrinkle was introduced to the Court. In 
Martinez v. Ryan, the United States Supreme Court announced a narrow 
exception to their decision from Coleman; ineffective assistance by a 
prisoner’s state post-conviction counsel may serve as cause to overcome a 
procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, where 
the State requires a defendant to bring that claim in state post-conviction 
proceedings, rather than on direct appeal, in the first instance.109 
This precise scenario occurred in Martinez and drove the Court to 
create a narrow exception to ensure that claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, where it is constitutionally guaranteed, have their chance to be 
heard. The state of Arizona does not allow a prisoner to bring claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct review.110 Instead, the prisoner 
must bring those claims in a state collateral proceeding in the first instance.111 
In Martinez, petitioner’s post-conviction counsel did not raise the claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and even stated that she “found no 
meritorious claims helpful to petitioner.”112 During his federal habeas review, 
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petitioner sought to bring his claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and 
state post-conviction counsel.113 Petitioner asserted that because the state 
post-conviction proceeding was the first place to challenge his conviction on 
the grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he had a constitutional 
right to an effective attorney in those post-conviction proceedings.114 
Essentially, petitioner asked, “whether a federal habeas court may excuse a 
procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim, when the claim was not 
properly presented in state court due to an attorney’s errors in an initial-
review collateral proceeding.”115 Martinez hoped that the Court would 
consider his procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, with his ineffective state habeas counsel’s actions serving as the 
necessary cause. 
Martinez was convicted of two counts of sexual conduct with a 
minor.116 On appeal, Martinez was assigned new counsel, who brought 
several claims on his behalf.117 However, pursuant to Arizona state law, his 
appellate counsel was unable to bring claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel on direct appeal.118 After his appellate counsel initiated a post-
conviction claim for Martinez, counsel made no claim that his trial counsel 
was ineffective.119 Further, the state trial court allowed Martinez forty-five 
days in which to bring a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.120 
However, Martinez failed to bring such a claim because he was unaware that 
his appellate counsel had initially filed collateral proceedings at all.121 
Martinez was essentially unaware that his case continued any further than his 
original appeal, because counsel had failed to inform Martinez of the post-
conviction filings. The state trial court therefore dismissed his action for post-
conviction relief, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and 
the Arizona Supreme court denied review.122 
Represented by new counsel, Martinez attempted to file a second 
notice of post-conviction relief with an Arizona trial court, alleging his trial 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution’s 
evidence.123 Essentially, Martinez attempted to do what his initial post-
conviction counsel failed to do, timely file his claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel. The court dismissed his petition, relying on an Arizona rule 
barring relief on a claim that could have been raised in a previous collateral 
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proceeding.124 The Arizona trial court stated that Martinez should have 
brought these claims in his first post-conviction proceeding and, therefore, 
denied relief.125 The Arizona Supreme Court declined review.126 
Finally, Martinez sought relief by filing a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus with the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 
raising his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.127 While he 
acknowledged that his claims were barred under state procedural rules of 
defaults, Martinez argued that he had cause to overcome such default.128 
Martinez claimed that “[h]is first post-conviction counsel was ineffective in 
failing to raise any claims in the first notice of post-conviction relief and in 
failing to notify Martinez of her actions.”129 The District court denied the 
petition, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed relying on 
Coleman; “absent a right to counsel in a collateral proceeding, an attorney’s 
errors in the proceeding do not establish cause for a procedural default.”130 
As noted above, the Coleman Court required a claim of ineffective counsel 
to rise to the level of constitutional violation before it may serve as cause to 
excuse a procedural default. The Coleman Court held that when counsel is 
not constitutionally guaranteed, ineffectiveness of such counsel necessarily 
could not violate one’s constitutional rights. The United States Supreme 
Court granted cert to determine whether there was an exception reserved for 
“those cases ‘where “state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can 
present a challenge to his conviction.”‘”131 
The Martinez Court stated that the Coleman Court suggested, “the 
Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings because ‘in [these] cases . . . state collateral review is the first 
place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.’”132 These cases, 
where a prisoner is required to bring claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in the first instance in a collateral proceeding, are their “one 
and only appeal” of such claims.133 The Martinez Court refused to decide 
whether this exception exists as a constitutional matter, and instead narrowed 
the question to “whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral 
proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause for 
a procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding.”134 The Martinez Court 
ultimately provided that a narrow exception to Coleman must exist where 
“[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings 
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may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial.”135 
The Martinez Court began by recognizing that the rule created by the 
Coleman Court did not present the occasion to apply this exact principle, to 
a case where attorney errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may 
qualify as cause for procedural default.136 Several distinguishing factors 
between the two cases make this apparent. Coleman alleged a failure of 
counsel on appeal from an initial-review collateral proceeding, while 
Martinez alleged failure of counsel on initial-review.137 Additionally, 
Coleman’s claims had been addressed by the state habeas court, while 
Arizona law mandated Martinez’s claims be brought in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding in the first instance.138 “When an attorney errs in initial-
review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state court at any level will 
hear the prisoner’s claim.”139 Further, without counsel’s error in an initial-
review collateral proceeding being able to serve as cause to excuse a 
procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will ever review 
petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, where counsel is 
constitutionally guaranteed.140 
The Martinez Court recognized that this does not apply to all post-
conviction proceedings; only those where the initial-review collateral 
proceeding is the first designated proceeding where a prisoner can raise a 
claim of ineffective assistance at trial.141 In these instances, such collateral 
proceeding is functioning as a prisoner’s direct appeal of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.142 If a prisoner is denied counsel on direct 
appeal, they have been denied fair process and the opportunity to adjudicate 
the merits of his claims.143 The Martinez Court held that the same logic 
applies in cases where ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims must be 
brought in initial-review collateral proceedings.144 Without counsel, a 
prisoner would be ill equipped to perform the necessary investigative work, 
unversed with trial strategy, unfamiliar with applicable law or procedural 
rules.145 “While confined in prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop 
the evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns 
on evidence outside the trial record.”146 
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The Martinez Court emphasized the importance of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims and the requirement that effective counsel 
be provided in order for a petitioner to effectively bring such claims. 
Recognizing that a prisoner’s right to trial counsel is a foundational 
requirement of the adversary system to ensure the prosecution’s case is 
properly tested, the Martinez Court noted that an initial-review collateral 
proceeding undertaken without counsel, or with ineffective counsel, may not 
properly ensure that sufficient consideration is given to a potentially 
substantial claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.147 Therefore, 
when a state’s procedural rules mandate that a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim be brought up, in the first instance, in a post-conviction 
setting, ineffective or absent counsel in the post-conviction setting may now 
serve as the “cause” necessary to overcome a procedural default of those 
original claims of ineffectiveness in a federal habeas case.148 
C. Davila v. Davis 
In Davila v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
particular exception presented in Martinez should also be extended to a 
defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and ultimately 
declined to extend.149 Recognizing that an extension of “cause” was given to 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Court now reached the 
question of whether a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
brings about the same constitutional concerns that drove the Court to excuse 
a procedural default based on post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness to 
initially bring such claim. 
The jury in Davila convicted the Petitioner of capital murder and 
sentenced him to death.150 Despite objections by petitioner’s trial counsel, the 
trial court instructed the jury on transferred intent after the jury requested 
clarification.151 On appeal, petitioner’s appellate counsel did not challenge 
the instruction on transferred intent, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed the conviction and sentence.152 The Petitioner sought habeas relief 
in Texas state court, where his state habeas counsel did not challenge the jury 
instruction or the failure of his appellate counsel to raise the issue on direct 
appeal.153 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief.154 
Petitioner sought federal habeas relief in Federal District Court, 
arguing that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing 
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to challenge the jury instruction.155 Invoking both Martinez and Trevino, 
Petitioner argued that his state habeas counsel’s ineffectiveness provides 
cause to excuse the procedural default on his claim of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.156 The District Court denied the petition concluding that 
Martinez and Trevino do not apply to excuse the procedural default of 
Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.157 The 
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to reverse the 
Fifth Circuit, seeking to extend Martinez and Trevino to his claim.158 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and denied such an extension of the 
rule established in Martinez.159 
The Davila Court rejected an expansion of Martinez because to do 
so would “replace the rule of Coleman with the exception of Martinez.”160 
Coleman provided that attorney error committed in the course of state post-
conviction proceedings, where the constitution does not guarantee the right 
to counsel, cannot supply cause to excuse a procedural default that occurs in 
those proceedings.161 Martinez qualified, rather than replaced, Coleman by 
creating an equitable exception to procedurally defaulted claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel only when a state mandates that those 
claims be raised in the first instance in an initial-review collateral proceeding 
rather than on direct appeal.162 
The Constitution guarantees the right to a criminal trial, but does not 
guarantee the right to an appeal at all.163 The Martinez court was primarily 
concerned with a defendant’s ability to have trial errors reviewed to reflect 
the importance of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial 
counsel.164 The Davila Court emphasized that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel does not equate to trial error, and therefore 
found that ineffective appellate counsel does not raise the same constitutional 
concerns as were found in Martinez.165 
The Martinez Court, by recognizing this narrow exception to provide 
for cause when a state explicitly or implicitly requires claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel be brought during initial-review collateral 
proceedings, made an equitable decision in light of the unique importance of 
protecting trial rights.166 This exception was intended to be a narrow one, 
                                                 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2063-64. 
 157. Id. at 2064. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2066. 
 161. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. 
 162. Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065. 
 163. Id. at 2066. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
214 BELMONT CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. I: 197 
reflecting the importance of such trial rights specifically.167 By refusing to 
expand the Martinez exception, the Davila Court proclaimed that it does 
nothing more than respect that intention.168 
The Petitioner in Davila then argued that his claim for ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel might never be reviewed if the rule in 
Coleman were not expanded to fit his case.169 The Davila Court rejected this 
argument stating that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not a trial 
error, therefore the constitutional concerns in Martinez regarding a 
defendant’s chance to have a trial error reviewed do not apply.170 While these 
claims may be viable, and brought before a court, the Davila Court held that 
such a claim does not carry the same constitutional weight as a trial error and 
therefore does not necessarily require review as a violation of a constitutional 
right would.171 
The chief concern the Martinez Court addressed by creating the 
narrow exception, was that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
a trial error, would escape review if the State required that defendant’s wait 
to bring the claim, in the first instance, in post-conviction proceedings.172 
Typically, the first time a trial error could be reviewed is on direct appeal, 
except when a state court mandates it be brought first in the post-conviction 
proceedings.173 If post-conviction counsel fails to raise the claim when it is 
first available to be raised, the claim will completely evade state review.174 
Additionally, “because attorney error in a state post-conviction proceeding 
does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default under Coleman, no 
federal court could consider the claim either.”175 Essentially, by eliminating 
the typical first chance review on initial appeal, and mandating review on 
post-conviction appeal, a state is moving a constitutionally guaranteed appeal 
outside of the arena where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed. Further, 
because a state has moved review to a stage in litigation where counsel is not 
constitutionally guaranteed, and the Coleman Court held that attorney error 
in such settings does not qualify to serve as “cause” to excuse a procedural 
default, without the exception from Martinez, these claims of ineffective trial 
counsel have the potential of falling through the crack of review. The 
Martinez court recognized the danger of a constitutional right evading 
review, and created this narrow exception to provide for trial error review in 
the narrowest of circumstances.176 
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The Davila Court held that a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel does not pose the same risk of evading review as a trial 
error does.177 The Court reasoned that a claim of ineffective appellate counsel 
based on a preserved trial error means that at least one court, the trial court, 
has considered the claim on the merits, even though appellate counsel failed 
to raise it again.178 If trial counsel failed to preserve an error, the Davila Court 
held that Petitioner’s proposed extension of the rule would still not 
necessarily give access to federal review of that error either.179 To be 
effective, appellate counsel is only required to raise arguments most likely to 
succeed on appeal.180 Even if the trial error is unpreserved, that error will not 
necessarily be plainly stronger than those errors that were preserved, thus 
appellate counsel is not required to bring every non-frivolous claim to be 
effective.181 Essentially, the Court stated it is unlikely a defendant could 
make a substantial claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
because in most instances where the trial court did not rule on a preserved 
error, appellate counsel is not required to raise every argument to be 
considered effective.182 Finally, if a trial error goes unpreserved and was so 
obvious that appellate counsel is constitutionally required to raise it on 
appeal, it is likely the trial counsel’s ineffective assistance caused the error, 
and the defendant could then invoke Martinez or Coleman instead.183 
Further, the Davila Court found the equitable considerations from 
Martinez to be inapplicable in the present case.184 In Martinez, the State 
purposefully moved trial counsel ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-
appeal process, where the constitution requires counsel, and into the realm of 
post-conviction proceedings where the constitution does not guarantee 
counsel.185 The Martinez court held that it would be inequitable for courts to 
refuse to hear claims of ineffective trial counsel when defendants are 
procedurally mandated to bring them first in a proceeding where counsel is 
not guaranteed to assist in raising it.186 
In contrast, the Davila Court reasoned that claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, by nature, could not be presented until after 
the end of the direct appeal.187 “Put another way, they necessarily must be 
heard in collateral proceedings, where counsel is not constitutionally 
guaranteed.”188 The fact that these claims are heard in proceedings where 
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counsel is not constitutionally required is an inherent function of the claim, 
and not a choice of the State; therefore, the Court found that the same 
equitable concerns from Martinez are inapplicable.189 
IV. THE INADVERTENT GAP CREATED BETWEEN MARTINEZ AND DAVILA, 
REQUIRING A SLIGHT EXTENSION OF MARTINEZ 
The majority opinion’s decision to decline to extend the Martinez 
exception to all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may prove too 
broad and prevent genuine trial errors from receiving review, therefore 
denying a prisoner of his constitutional right to a fair trial. There appears to 
be a gap between the rules of Martinez and Davila, where a small number of 
cases will fit, and require an extension of Martinez to claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. These are the cases where a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not rely on an underlying trial 
counsel error, and both appellate and post-conviction counsel’s error in 
failing to raise results in a violation of a petitioner’s constitutional right to a 
fair trial. Further, these are the claims that were not available for a trial court 
to hear, and now face the potential of never being heard if both appellate 
counsel, and post-conviction counsel, fails to raise it. These upcoming cases 
likely to reach the Court should, in keeping with the historic spirit of the writ 
to protect from unconstitutional confinement and the use of the “cause and 
prejudice” standard, be granted a Martinez extension to close the gap 
between Davila, to ensure all trial errors are properly heard. 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer believed the Davila Court 
missed the point when it said that at least one court will have considered the 
underlying legal error.190 Breyer’s illustrative dissent points toward this gap 
of cases that are not provided for between Martinez and Davila. Breyer views 
the defendant’s complaint in Davila as regarding the ineffectiveness of his 
appellate counsel, not about the underlying trial error.191 He writes that 
claims of ineffectiveness, likely based on failure to appeal a trial court’s 
erroneous decision, do not help the defendant correct the trial court’s 
errors.192 Those errors form the basis of the ineffectiveness claim, but the 
main claim is still the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel’s failure to raise 
such appeals.193 Justice Breyer deems that without extending the exception 
from Martinez, a court will never review the ineffectiveness of their appellate 
counsel.194 
The more intriguing point brought out by Justice Breyer’s dissent 
deals with claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, where no 
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error was committed by trial counsel at all. Essentially, the Davila Court’s 
holding created a gap by inadvertently overlooking claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel that do not rely on an underlying claim of 
ineffective trial counsel. When an error in trial occurs, but does not rest on 
an error committed by trial counsel, appellate counsel must bring it in the 
first instance on direct appeal. It is these claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, that do not rest on a trial attorney’s error, that simply arose 
through trial, which appellate counsel should have brought up to be heard 
initially on direct appeal, but for some reason failed to do so rendering 
counsel ineffective. The gap is not created by claims that appellate counsel 
made a small error, where it is not of a constitutional magnitude, for example 
by failing to raise a fact that trial counsel did not properly raise; the gap is 
found where appellate counsel makes a constitutional error in failing to bring 
up a severe trial error that should have been reviewed at least once before 
post-conviction proceedings, and could have only been reviewed in the first 
instance on direct appeal. 
The concern focuses on those errors which amount to a violation of 
the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. The majority in Davila was correct 
to reject those claims of ineffective appellate counsel that merely rely on 
error committed by trial counsel, as those ultimately were either heard by the 
trial court when preserved, or do not amount to a constitutional violation of 
the right to counsel when appellate counsel chooses not to raise them. The 
majority also correctly focused on the need to reserve the Martinez exception 
for significant trial concerns to protect a constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. 
However, when those two concerns merge, appellate counsel’s error 
amounting to a violation of a constitutionally guaranteed fair trial, then an 
extension of Martinez to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
becomes not only appropriate, but necessary. 
Justice Breyer, illustrates that there will be some cases where no 
underlying trial error serves as the basis for appellate counsel’s 
ineffectiveness.195 “Supposed that, during the pendency of the appeal, 
appellate counsel learns of a Brady violation, juror misconduct, judicial bias, 
or some similar violation whose basis was not known during the trial.”196 If 
appellate counsel fails to pursue such claims, that ineffectiveness now serves 
as the basis for the claim, and without the Martinez exception extension, no 
court will hear this appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim.197 No error by 
trial counsel here serves as the basis for appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, 
however these are trial errors that amount to a constitutionally unfair trial. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent helpfully provides a vivid example, which 
he believes demonstrates a case where an extension of Martinez to claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is required: 
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Now suppose that a prisoner claims that the trial court made 
an important error of law, say, improperly instructing the 
jury, or that the prosecution engaged in misconduct. He 
believes his lawyer on direct appeal should have raised those 
errors because they led to his conviction or (as here) a death 
sentence. The appellate lawyer’s failure to do so, the 
prisoner might claim, amounts to ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. The prisoner cannot make this argument 
on direct appeal, for the direct appeal is the very proceeding 
in which he is represented by the lawyer he says was 
ineffective. Next suppose the prisoner fails to raise his 
appellate lawyer’s ineffectiveness at the initial state habeas 
proceeding, either because he was not represented by 
counsel in that proceeding or because his counsel there also 
was ineffective. When he brings his case to the federal 
habeas court, the State contends that the prisoner’s failure to 
present his claim during the initial state habeas proceeding 
constitutes a procedural default that precludes federal review 
of his claim.198 
Based on this example, Justice Breyer pointed out that a prisoner in 
this circumstance could not be treated any differently than one whose claim 
falls within the Martinez exception because the end result either way is a 
constitutional claim completely evading review.199 
Another illustrative example of a case falling between Martinez and 
Davila would include a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
for a failure to raise a claim of a Brady violation. In Brady v. Maryland, the 
United States Supreme Court held that suppression of requested evidence, 
favorable to an accused, by the prosecution violates due process.200 
Therefore, if a Brady violation by the prosecution is discovered post trial, it 
becomes the duty of appellate counsel to raise this violation of trial rights in 
the first instance on direct appeal. If appellate counsel is ineffective for 
failing to raise this issue, then a significant due process right, which has been 
covered under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, has been violated. 
This clearly demonstrates the cases where the two concerns of Martinez 
converge; an error from appellate counsel, not relying on trial counsel error, 
results in a constitutionally unfair trial. 
Further, if a prisoner’s post-conviction counsel is then additionally 
ineffective for failing to raise appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, according 
to the majority opinion in Davila, this claim is procedurally barred in a 
federal habeas court. This claim evades review on direct appeal, the initial 
                                                 
 198. Id. at 2071-72. 
 199. Id. at 2072. 
 200. 158 A.L.R. Fed. 401 (Originally published in 1999). 
 
2018] THE GAP BETWEEN MARTINEZ AND DAVILA 219 
chance to be raised, because only appellate counsel was ineffective for a 
failure to raise. Then, because Coleman tells us that ineffectiveness of post-
conviction counsel cannot serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of 
the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this claim may not be 
raised on federal habeas corpus, and thus receives no review at all. 
In this scenario, a significant trial error affecting the prisoner’s 
constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective counsel on direct appeal, will 
completely evade review of any court. This is completely inconsistent with 
the aspirations of Martinez, that significant trial errors be heard by at least 
one court, and that ineffective post-conviction counsel may occasionally 
serve as cause to excuse those procedural defaults of constitutionally sound 
trial error claims. 
A claim, such as a Brady violation, that might only be brought on 
direct appeal is procedurally identical to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel that is mandated to be brought in post-conviction proceedings 
in the first instance. In both instances we have claims that are initially brought 
up in their initial trial or direct proceedings, and then have a single chance to 
be heard by a court on appeal in a post-conviction proceeding. If trial counsel 
is ineffective for any reason, or if appellate counsel is ineffective for failing 
to raise a legal issue, such as a Brady violation from trial, it is necessary for 
post-conviction counsel to bring such ineffectiveness claims in the first 
instance. If a failure on post-conviction counsel’s part to bring such claims 
of ineffectiveness arises, without the exception in Martinez allowing such 
post-conviction ineffectiveness to serve as cause, there are now two claims 
resting solely on a legal error in trial that will completely evade review; one 
based on trial counsel’s error, and one based on a trial error that appellate 
counsel was constitutionally obligated to raise. These errors infringe on a 
prisoner’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and the right to effective trial 
counsel, which has been coined by the Coleman, Martinez, and Davila Courts 
as bedrock of our adversarial trial system. 
An extension of Martinez to include this narrow class of claims is 
the best solution in closing the gap of cases between Martinez and Davila. 
The Davila Court properly draws the line against extending the exception to 
ineffective appellate counsel claims that are based on trial counsel errors. 
However, there will soon be a case where no such trial counsel error exists, 
and appellate counsel’s error constitutionally affects a petitioner’s right to a 
fair trial. It is this small class of cases, where the constitutional concerns of a 
fair trial that led to the Martinez exception initially, will be properly served 
by allowing post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness to serve as “cause” in 
order to have a significant trial error be heard by a court and corrected. 
Not creating this exception will lead to claims of ineffective 
appellate counsel being ignored or forgotten by post-conviction counsel, and 
thus giving no reprieve on petition for federal habeas corpus because of its 
procedural labels. Just because appellate counsel initially committed the 
error, and then post-conviction counsel failed to raise that ineffectiveness, 
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this should not prevent the claim from going unheard. The focus should not 
be on the type of counsel who was ineffective. The focus should be on the 
underlying claim, as the Davila Court focused on when rejecting the 
extension to claims where appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness relied on a trial 
counsel as the underlying basis. The Court determined that a simple trial 
error, based on trial counsel’s error, already had an opportunity for review 
and could not be heard again. The underlying claim in these situations is trial 
counsel’s error and appellate counsel’s error in not raising trial counsel’s 
error. 
However, the underlying claims in these next cases of ineffective 
appellate counsel will not rely on any action or error of trial counsel. These 
claims will rely on constitutional errors in trial, where appellate counsel had 
the initial chance to raise the claim and was ineffective for failing to do so. 
Just as the Martinez Court allowed post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness 
to serve as cause when the underlying claim affected a constitutional right to 
counsel and fair trial, so too will an extension to those constitutional claims 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This will properly close the gap 
between the two cases, balancing those underlying claims that are 
constitutionally grounded and those that are not. The notions of federalism 
and comity are properly served by allowing states the first chance review, but 
not closing federal court doors to hearing significant constitutional trial 
claims. 
V. CLOSING THE GAP; THE SOLUTION MOST CONSISTENT WITH 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS HISTORY AND CURRENT CASE LAW. 
In support of the conclusion that an extension of Martinez is 
necessary to fill the gap of cases created by Davila, we come full circle back 
to the origins and importance of the writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas 
corpus gives a prisoner a chance to invoke the writ, come to court, and plead 
their case of wrongful imprisonment. Over time, the writ has served many 
purposes, and our Founding Fathers believed it was significant enough to 
include within our country’s constitution. While serving the notions of 
comity and federalism, federal habeas corpus has evolved in such a manner 
to respect the state court’s rights to hear claims initially and attempt to 
provide a remedy when available, before a federal court hears the claims. 
This prevents a prisoner from bypassing the state courts and taking their 
federal claims straight to a federal court initially. However, obvious 
exceptions arose; the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default serve 
such exceptions. One must exhaust all state appeal options and give the state 
a fair first hearing of all claims. However, if no state remedial paths are 
utilized, and a claim was never brought before a state court, the claim is 
considered procedurally defaulted. The harsh realities of the procedural 
default were quelled ultimately by the Sykes Court, instituting a “cause and 
prejudice” standard, necessary for a petitioner to establish before a court may 
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excuse a procedural default. The “cause and prejudice” standard ensures that 
there was a justifiable reason why the claim was not brought before a court 
prior to issuance of a petition of federal habeas corpus, and demonstrates that 
there would be actual prejudice to the petitioner if the claim were wholly 
evaded. 
Agreeing upon what constitutes “cause”, the so called “fatal-prong” 
of the Sykes standard lead to the development of many circumstances that are 
significant enough to serve as cause. The most notable of these, for the 
purposes of this note, is a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. The trilogy of cases regarding when ineffectiveness of post-
conviction counsel may serve as “cause” for a procedural default highlights 
exactly why a gap exists between Martinez and Davila, and just how it can 
be resolved when these next generations of cases appears before the Court. 
Coleman established the importance of federalism, the application of 
federal habeas corpus, and puts a substantial limitation of a defendant’s 
ability to raise arguments for the first time. The Coleman Court held that 
when counsel is not constitutionally guaranteed such as in post-conviction 
proceedings, then ineffectiveness of such counsel necessarily does not 
amount to a violation of constitutional rights. Without a violation of such 
constitutional magnitude, “cause” cannot lie to excuse a procedural default. 
Next, along came Martinez, recognizing that certain state procedural 
structures constitutionally require a narrow exception to Coleman. In cases 
where a state requires that claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be 
brought, in the first instance, in post-conviction proceedings, then a claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel must serve as “cause” to 
excuse the procedural default of the initial claim of ineffective trial counsel. 
When post-conviction counsel is ineffective in failing to bring a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a court may never review a significant 
trial error. 
Several important pillars of federal habeas are served by the 
Martinez decision. First, the Court held the constitutional guarantee of 
effective trial counsel on the high pedestal it deserves, and recognized the 
need to preserve such claims. The Martinez Court, by creating the exception 
to Coleman, ensured that every prisoner would have the opportunity to have 
trial errors reviewed, no matter the state’s mandated procedural structure. 
Second, while Coleman holds that post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness 
necessarily cannot serve as cause, the Martinez Court recognized that there 
are times when such ineffectiveness rises to a level of constitutional violation 
and must serve as cause. When post-conviction counsel fails to raise a claim 
of ineffective trial counsel, a violation of a person’s constitutional right to 
counsel during trial, then counsel’s failure to raise that claim is a 
constitutional abuse as well. 
Finally, the Davila Court distinguished the claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and reserved the Martinez exception 
only to claims for trial counsel. However, this broad categorization of trial 
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counsel and appellate counsel ineffectiveness overlooks a gap between the 
two types of errors. The focus of the Davila Court was upon which counsel 
committed the initial error, and whether or not that counsel was 
constitutionally guaranteed as the Coleman Court detailed. The Davila Court 
made the correct decision when it comes to appellate counsels’ errors that 
rely on a mistake made by trial counsel. A trial judge likely heard these 
claims when trial counsel first raised them for preservation, or these are 
claims such that appellate counsel is not obligated to raise again. Appellate 
counsel need only raise those claims which are likely to succeed, or are 
constitutionally obligated. 
However, the Davila Court neglected to account for those 
constitutional trial errors, occurring not because of trial counsel’s errors, 
which necessarily must be brought in the first instance on direct appeal. The 
Davila Court’s focus was too attached to the idea that appellate counsel 
committed the error, and that appellate counsel is not guaranteed. The focus 
must shift to the underlying claim that a petitioner wants tried; their 
constitutional claims of trial error. These are the errors that occurred either 
during or after trial, were not discovered until after trial, and significantly 
harmed a petitioner’s right to a fair trial. The first opportunity to raise such 
claims would be on direct appeal, and directly concern the trial itself. If 
appellate counsel is ineffective for failing to raise these claims that they are 
obligated to raise, the onus to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claim is on post-conviction counsel. The responsibility to preserve a 
person’s constitutionally guaranteed fair trial shifts onto post-conviction 
counsel, and just as in Martinez, post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise 
these claims would constitute a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right 
to a fair trial. As discussed in Coleman, and solidified in Martinez, the only 
time post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness may serve as “cause” to 
excuse a procedural default, is when that error rises to a constitutional 
deprivation. These are the cases that require an extension of Martinez to fill 
the gap. 
Progressing through the historical evolution of the writ, the purposes 
it is intended to serve, and the cases that have evolved over time to serve 
exceptions not originally thought of lead us to this conclusion today. History 
tells us that our Founding Fathers intended to allow courts to use the writ to 
hear cases where a prisoner believes his confinement is unlawful. The 
Congressional Act of 1867 ensured that federal and state prisoners alike 
would have that opportunity. The doctrine of exhaustion ensures that 
federalism is served by letting states have the first opportunity to hear and 
cure a case. The doctrine of procedural default, and the Sykes “cause and 
prejudice” standard ensured that even significant claims accidentally 
overlooked would be heard. The Coleman Court ensured that “cause” only 
meant those claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel that 
were constitutionally egregious. The Martinez Court determined when those 
claims became a constitutional concern, and held when post-conviction 
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counsel’s ineffectiveness meant deprivation of review for a significant trial 
error, cause must be available. And finally, Davila left a gap that now 
requires filling. If we follow the path set by history and case law, the only 
logical conclusion is that when post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness 
threatens a significant constitutional guarantee of counsel or a fair trial, then 
the “cause” prong must be satisfied. Martinez must be extended to ensure 
that those trial errors appellate counsel fails to raise, which affect the 
constitutionality of a fair trial, receive proper review when sought through a 
petition of federal habeas corpus. 
